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Abstract
We offer a novel explanation for collateral based on the notion that lenders make dis-
cretionary credit decisions that are too conservative. There is no borrower asymmetric
information or moral hazard. Rather, the problem is that if lenders cannot extract the full
surplus from the projects they finance (e.g., due to credit market competition), they may re-
ject low-, but positive-NPV projects. Collateral provides lenders with additional protection
in bad states, thus improving their payoffs from projects with a relatively high likelihood of
bad states and thus precisely from those projects that are inefficiently rejected. Our model
is consistent with existing empirical evidence and provides new empirical predictions.
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1 Introduction
Lending decisions are often discretionary.1 After reviewing a borrower’s request for credit,
lenders use their judgement and expertise to decide whether to accept the borrower:
“[F]ormalized interviews with bank managers indicate that loan officers located in
the bank’s branches enjoyed substantial autonomy when granting and pricing small
business loans. The officers’ own assessment of the development of the relationship
with the firm, the skills and reputation of the firm’s management, and the quality of
the firm’s business vision (i.e., “soft” information in Stein (2002)) played key roles in
the lending decision. Though loan officers were required to “harden” their assessment
internally by supplying key statistics and other relevant written information, much
local discretion remained” (Degryse and Ongena (2003)).2
This paper argues that the discretionary nature of credit decisions provides a natural role for
collateral. The argument proceeds in two steps: (i) in many instances, the lender’s accept or
reject decision will be biased, and (ii) collateral helps to alleviate this bias.
A bias in the lender’s credit decision arises if–e.g., due to credit market competition–the
lender must leave the borrower a share of the created surplus, implying that she cannot keep the
full project cash flow for herself. As the lender provides the full investment outlay, this implies
that she only accepts projects for which the expected project cash flow sufficiently exceeds the
investment outlay. The lender thus rejects low-, but positive-NPV projects. Put simply, the
lender is inefficiently conservative.3
The unique role of collateral is that it allows the lender to obtain a repayment in excess of
the project’s cash flow. Evidently, the lender cannot receive excess repayments in all states of
nature. The question is thus how should collateral be used? We show that collateral should
be used only in “bad” states of nature, i.e., in states where the project’s cash flow is low.
1An important exception is fully automated credit scoring as used, e.g., in the credit card industry.
2See also Saunders and Allen (2002): “The credit decision is left to the local or branch lending officer or
relationship manager. Implicitly, this person’s expertise, subjective judgement, and his weighting of certain key
factors are the most important determinants in the decision to grant credit”.
3 Inderst and Müller (2003) examine the implications of this inefficiency for the optimal security design. It is
assumed that the borrower has no pledgeable assets; hence there is no role for collateral.
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Giving the lender collateral in bad states–and leaving her less than the full project cash flow
in good states–yields the greatest “bang for the buck”: as bad states are relatively more likely
under low-NPV projects, it improves the lender’s payoff from precisely those projects that are
inefficiently rejected. By contrast, giving the lender collateral in good states–and leaving her
less than the full project cash flow in bad states–improves the lender’s payoff primarily from
high-NPV projects. But these are projects the lender would have accepted anyway. Hence,
adding collateral in bad states maximizes the lender’s incentives to accept low-, but positive-
NPV projects, thus minimizing her conservative bias.
This is not the first paper to argue why collateral may be optimal. Previous work has argued
that collateral can alleviate problems of borrower moral hazard and asymmetric information.4
In asymmetric information models (e.g., Bester (1985); Chan and Kanatas (1987); Besanko and
Thakor (1987a,b)), collateral is used as a sorting device. In equilibrium, low-risk borrowers
pledge more collateral than high-risk borrowers, which is the opposite of what Berger and Udell
(1995) and other empirical studies find.
In moral hazard models, collateral is used as an incentive device (e.g., Chan and Thakor
(1987); Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991); Boot and Thakor (1994)). Collateral improves the
borrower’s incentives to work hard. By working hard, he can reduce the probability of default,
thus avoiding the loss of his collateral. According to this basic intuition, collateralized loans
should have a lower default probability than unsecured loans, which the opposite of what Berger
and Udell (1990) and other studies find.
This basic intuition may not hold if there are different borrower types. For instance, Boot,
Thakor, and Udell (1991) show that if borrower quality and effort are substitutes, collateral
may be associated with both a higher ex-ante borrower risk and a higher ex-post default risk,
which is consistent with the empirical evidence.5 However, if quality and effort are complements,
collateral may be associated with both a lower ex-ante borrower risk and a lower default risk.
It is thus probably fair to say that moral hazard does not necessarily (in the sense of a robust
empirical prediction) produce the positive correlation between collateral and risk found in em-
pirical studies. In our model, collateral is associated with both a higher ex-ante borrower risk
4See Coco (2000) for a literature survey.
5See also Chan and Thakor (1987) and the discussion in Section 5.
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and a higher ex-post default risk.
Given that lender discretion is at the heart of our argument, we attempt to endogenize it.
Consistent with the opening quote, we assume that the lender’s decision to accept or reject
the borrower is partly based on qualitative, “soft” information, e.g., information about the
borrower’s managerial quality. Naturally, the assessment of qualitative information is difficult–if
not impossible–to verify vis-á-vis outsiders. (The lender could always argue that her impression
of the borrower is bad even when it is good.)6 Given that contracts cannot condition on the
lender’s credit risk assessment, her accept or reject decision is discretionary.
For the lender’s decision to be truly discretionary, a further assumption is needed: not only
must the lender’s credit risk assessment be unobservable to outsiders, it must also be true that
nobody can replicate it. As for competing lenders, we assume that they do not have access to
the same soft information as the (original) lender. Insofar as soft information is valuable for
the assessment of credit risk, this implies that the (original) lender has a better estimate of
the project’s default likelihood.7 For instance, Brunner, Krahnen, and Weber (2000) argue that
“private corporate ratings (internal ratings) reflect the core business of commercial banks, whose
superior information as compared to an external assessment by the market allows a more precise
estimate of the POD [probability of default]”. To fix ideas, we may think of the borrower as
a small business, the lender as a local small-business lender, and competing lenders as distant,
“arm’s-length” lenders or as a “competitive credit market”.
As far as the borrower is concerned, we assume that what distinguishes borrowers from
(professional) lenders is that–even if the borrower had access to the same information as the
local lender–he would lack the expertise to replicate the local lender’s credit risk assessment
and thus her estimate of the project’s success likelihood.8
6Stein (2002) argues that a distinguishing characteristic of soft information is its nonverifiability. Similarly,
Brunner, Krahnen, and Weber (2000) argue that “internal ratings should therefore be seen as private information.
Typically, banks do not inform their customers of the internal ratings or the implied PODs [probability of default],
nor do they publicize the criteria and methods used in deriving them”. Similarly, Treacey and Carey (2000) note
that “[A]t banks, ratings are kept private ...”.
7Grunert, Norden, and Weber (2002), analyzing credit file data from large German banks, find that the
inclusion of soft information in internal credit ratings significantly improves the accuracy of predicting default.
8Manove, Padilla, and Pagano (2001) note: “As a result, banks are likely to be more knowledgeable about
some aspects of project quality than many of the entrepreneurs they lend to [...] This is why banks are, and
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In summary, neither the borrower (for lack of expertise) nor the competitive credit market
(for lack of access to soft information) can observe or replicate the local lender’s credit risk
assessment. This has additional implications. First, it implies that both the optimal contract
and the lender’s credit decision are renegotiation-proof, for renegotiation between the local lender
and the borrower takes place under asymmetric information. Second, competition between the
local lender and the competitive credit market is imperfect.
While most of the existing arguments for collateral assume borrower moral hazard or asym-
metric information, some papers, like ours, assume incentive problems on the part of the lender.
Rajan and Winton (1995) examine the effect of collateral on the lender’s ex-post monitoring
incentives. Monitoring is valuable because it allows the lenders to claim additional collateral if
the firm enters into financial distress. The issue is thus not whether financial claims should be
collateralized ex ante, but whether lenders will try to collateralize their claims ex post. Manove,
Padilla, and Pagano (2001) argue that collateral and screening are substitutes. Lenders either
demand collateral or screen borrowers. By contrast, in our model collateral reinforces the effi-
ciency of screening: if the local lender did not assess the borrower’s credit risk prior to the credit
decision, collateral would have no value.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 shows
why the local lender has a conservative bias and why collateral alleviates this bias. Section 4
considers exogenous variations in the borrower’s assets, project risk, project size, and the cost of
borrowing from distant lenders. Section 5 summarizes the empirical implications of our model.
Section 6 concludes. Appendix A extends our basic setting to a continuum of cash flows. All
proofs are in Appendix B.
2 The Model
Basic Setup
A firm (“the borrower”) has an indivisible project requiring a fixed investment outlay k > 0.9
ought to be, in the project-evaluation business”. Consistent with the notion that professional lenders are better
at estimating default risk, Reid (1991) finds that bank-financed firms are more likely to survive than firms funded
by family investors.
9Bester (1985), Chan and Kanatas (1985), Chan and Thakor (1987), Besanko and Thakor (1987a), Boot,
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Financing can be either provided by a local lender or distant lenders. We frequently refer to the
distant lenders as “competitive credit market”.
To secure the loan, the borrower can pledge assets, e.g., business property, machines, or
receivables due in the future. Denote the value of the borrower’s assets by w. The project cash
flow x is verifiable and can be either high (x = xh) or low (x = xl). The two cash-flow model
is the simplest framework to illustrate our main argument. In Appendix A, we show that it
straightforwardly extends to a setting with a continuum of cash flows. We finally assume that
xl + w < k, which implies that the investment cannot be financed through a safe claim. The
risk-free rate of interest is normalized to zero.
The “Local Advantage”
The difference between the local lender and the competitive credit market is that the local
lender has better information about the project’s success likelihood. Precisely, we assume that
the competitive credit market has access to all verifiable (or “hard”) information such as, e.g.,
financial data. Given this information, the probability that the project will be successful–i.e.,
that x = xh–is p ∈ (0, 1). The expected project cash flow is µ := pxh + (1− p)xl. We assume
that µ > k, i.e., the project’s NPV based on hard information information is positive.
Besides having access to hard information, the local lender has additionally access to quali-
tative (or “soft”) information, e.g., information about managerial quality.10 We assume that the
local lender’s credit risk assessment can be represented by a continuous variable s ∈ [0, 1].11 A
high value of s indicates that the project is of high quality, implying that it has a high probability
of success. Let ps denote the project’s success probability based on hard and soft information.
Accordingly, we assume that ps is increasing in s, which implies that the expected project cash
flow, µs := psxh + (1 − ps)xl, is also increasing in s. As the competitive credit market only
observes p–but not ps–consistency of beliefs implies that p =
R 1
0 psf(s)ds, where f(s) is the
Thakor, and Udell (1991), Boot and Thakor (1994), and Rajan and Winton (1995) all assume a fixed loan size. A
notable exception is Besanko and Thakor (1987b). Assuming a fixed loan size implies that the set of contracting
variables reduces to two variables: collateral and interest rate.
10See our introductory remarks. Another reason why the local lender might have an advantage is due to her
experience from having granted similar loans in the past (e.g., Boot and Thakor (2000)).
11This may be interpreted as the local lender’s internal rating of the borrower. See Treacy and Carey (2000)
for an overview of internal rating procedures at US banks.
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density of s.
To formalize the idea that having access to soft information is beneficial, we assume that
µ1 > k and µ0 < k, i.e., the project’s NPV taking into account hard and soft information is
positive for high s and negative for low s. Hence, the local lender is able to distinguish between
positive- and negative-NPV projects. The competitive credit market, by contrast, only knows
the project’s NPV based on hard information, which is positive.
We are not the first to model credit market competition between a better informed lender
and an arm’s-length credit market: Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992), and von Thadden (2004) all
consider competition between a single lender with better information about a borrower and an
uninformed credit market.12
A possible application of our setting is small-business lending. Petersen and Rajan (2002)
(for the United States) and Degryse and Ongena (2003) (for Belgium) document that the median
distance between banks and small-firm borrowers is four and 1.4 miles, respectively, suggesting
that local lenders have indeed a competitive advantage. In the same spirit, Petersen and Rajan
(1995) argue that “credit markets for small firms are local”, and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales
(2004) refer to “direct evidence of the informational disadvantage of distant lenders in Italy”.
Similarly, Berger, Klapper, and Udell (2001) find that small firms in Argentina are more apt to
borrow from local than from foreign banks.13 Finally, access to qualitative information appears
to be particularly important in small-business lending: Treacy and Carey (2000) show that
qualitative factors–while less important in internal ratings of loans to larger firms–are crucial
in internal ratings of small- and medium-sized borrowers.
As far as the borrower is concerned, we assume that–even if he had access to the same
information–he lacks the skills and expertise to replicate the local lender’s credit risk assessment
and probability estimate.14 Hence, neither the competitive credit market (for lack of access to
12See also Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004) and Hauswald and Marquez (2003). Our asymmetric notion of
credit market competition differs from Thakor (1996), who considers competition between multiple lenders who
all observe the same (high) signal about a borrower after screening his project. (Lenders who observe a low signal
optimally drop out of the competition.)
13Like our paper, Hauswald and Marquez (2003) and Almazan (2002) assume that lenders who are closer to a
borrower have better information about the borrower than distant lenders.
14As the information is partly soft, the borrower cannot credibly communicate it to other lenders. For instance,
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soft information) nor the borrower (for lack of expertise) can observe or replicate s or ps. As the
local lender’s credit decision is based on these variables, her decision is discretionary.
It is easy to show that–given our assumptions–the “standard solution” of having the local
lender reveal her private information by choosing from a prespecified menu of contracts with
different collateral levels and repayment requirements (i.e., interest rates) is strictly suboptimal
in our model. Rather, the unique solution is to offer a single contract and accept or reject the
borrower on the basis of this contract. This is consistent with the notion that “loan decisions
for many types of retail loans are accept or reject decisions. All borrowers who are accepted are
often charged the same rate of interest and by implication the same risk premium. [...] In the
terminology of finance, retail customers are more likely to be sorted or rationed by loan quantity
restrictions ratherthan by price or interest rate differences” (Saunders and Thomas (2001)).
Sequence of Events
There are three dates: τ = 0, 1, and 2.
τ = 0. To attract the borrower, the local lender and the competitive credit market make
competiting offers.15 The borrower then decides whether to visit the competitive credit market
or the local lender.
τ = 1. Lenders evaluate the borrower’s project and decide whether to provide financing.
We allow for both renegotiation and competition after the project evaluation. We consider
renegotiation at the end of Section 3. As far as interim competition is concerned, we assume
that the competitive credit market can observe whether the borrower has previously visited the
local lender.16 In practice, lenders typically check a borrower’s credit history prior to making an
offer. In many countries, including the United States, credit bureaus provide this information in
the form of credit reports. Such credit reports commonly show whether and which other lenders
have made similar inquiries in the past, including the date of the inquiry and the identity of the
he would always argue that his managerial skills are good.
15 Is it a reasonable assumption that lenders make offers before evaluating a borrower’s projects? At least in
the context of small-business lending, this appears to be the case. At Chase Manhattan, a major small-business
lender in the United States, applicants for small business loans are initially shown a pricing chart illustrating
what interest rate they will get if their loan application is approved. The interest rate depends on verifiable data
such as the prime rate, loan size, maturity, and collateral. A copy is available from the authors.
16Without this assumption, there exists no equilibrium in pure strategies. See Broecker (1990) for details.
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inquirer (Jappelli and Pagano (2002)). To the extent that the competitive credit market has
access to the borrower’s credit report, it thus knows whether or not the borrower has previously
visited the local lender.
τ = 2. The project cash flow is realized and repayments are made.
Financial Contracts
A financial contract specifies repayments tl ≤ xl and th ≤ xh out of the project’s cash flow,
an amount of collateral C ≤ w, and repayments cl ≤ C and ch ≤ C out of the collateralized
assets. The total repayment in the low and high cash-flow state is denoted by Rl := tl + cl and
Rh := th + ch, respectively.17
3 Lender Conservativism and Collateral
We first derive some general properties of the optimal credit decision and financial contract.
Subsequently, we solve for the (unique) equilibrium outcome in the credit market.
Optimal Credit Decision: General Properties
The first-best credit decision takes a simple form. Given that µs < k at low values of s and
µs > k at high values of s, and given that µs is increasing in s, there exists a unique first-best
cutoff sFB ∈ (0, 1) defined by µsFB = k such that the project’s NPV is negative if s < sFB, zero
if s = sFB, and positive if s > sFB. The first-best optimal credit decision is thus to grant credit
if and only if s ≥ sFB, or equivalently if and only if ps ≥ psFB , where
psFB =
k − xl
xh − xl
. (1)
Consider next the local lender’s privately optimal credit decision. The local lender accepts
the project if and only if her conditional expected payoff
Us(Rl, Rh) := psRh + (1− ps)Rl
17This excludes the possibility that the local lender “buys” the borrower’s project before evaluating it. Using
a standard argument, we assume that such upfront payments would attract a large pool of fraudulent borrowers,
or “fly-by-night operators”, i.e., borrowers with no real project (see Rajan (1992)). This argument also rules out
that the local lender pays a penalty to the borrower if he is rejected.
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equals or exceeds her investment outlay k. It is immediate that we can exclude contracts under
which the project is either accepted or rejected for all s ∈ [0, 1]. Since Rl ≤ w + xl < k,
this implies that Rh > k > Rl. Given that ps is increasing in s, this in turn implies that
Us(Rl, Rh) is increasing in s, which in turn implies that the local lender grants credit if and only
if s ≥ s∗(Rl, Rh), where s∗(Rl, Rh) ∈ (0, 1) is unique and defined by Us∗(Rl, Rh) = k. Hence,
the local lender’s privately optimal decision also takes the form of a cutoff rule: grant credit if
and only if the assessment of the borrower is sufficiently positive. As above, we can alternatively
express the local lender’s decision in terms of a critical success probability. Accordingly, the
local lender grants credit if and only if ps ≥ ps∗ , where
ps∗ =
k −Rl
Rh −Rl
(2)
This is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The first-best credit decision is to accept the borrower if and only if ps ≥ psFB ,
where psFB is defined in (1). In contrast, the local lender’s privately optimal credit decision is
to accept the borrower if and only if ps ≥ ps∗ , where ps∗ is defined in (2).
Optimal Financial Contract: General Properties
We now derive our basic argument for why collateral is optimal. We proceed in two steps.
Denote by V > 0 the borrower’s reservation utility–i.e., his expected utility from going to the
competitive credit market–at τ = 0. Taking V as given, we first derive the optimal contract
maximizing the local lender’s expected payoff.18 In a second step, we solve for the unique credit
market equilibrium, which pins down a unique equilibrium value of V .
The local lender’s problem is to choose a contract that maximizes her expected payoff
U(Rl,Rh) :=
Z 1
s∗
[Us (Rl, Rh)− k]f(s)ds (3)
subject to the constraint that the borrower receives at least V ,Z 1
s∗
[µs − Us (Rl, Rh)]f(s)ds ≥ V , (4)
and the constraint Us∗(Rl, Rh) = k characterizing the optimal credit decision at τ = 1. Note
that if the borrower is rejected, the project will not be financed. As we show below, this is
indeed the unique equilibrium outcome in the credit market.
18To ensure that the lender’s maximization program has a solution, we must assume that V is not too large.
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By standard arguments, the borrower’s participation constraint (4) binds, implying that
the local lender receives any surplus in excess of V . As the residual claimant, the local lender
designs a contract inducing her to make as efficient as possible a credit decision at τ = 1. As
the following proposition shows, the optimal contract stipulates a positive amount of collateral.
Proposition 1. The optimal financial contract stipulates a positive amount of collateral C ∈
(0, w] such that the local lender receives Rl = xl + C in the low cash-flow state and Rh in the
high cash-flow state, where Rl < Rh < xh.
Proof. See Appendix.
By Proposition 1, collateral is used only in the low cash-flow state.19 The intuition is as
follows. As the local lender must leave the borrower an expected utility of V > 0, she cannot
keep the full project cash flow for herself. Without collateral, the local lender’s expected payoff
Us (Rl, Rh) is thus strictly less than the expected project cash flow µs for all s ∈ [0, 1]. In
particular, we have that UsFB (Rl, Rh) < µsFB = k, i.e., the local lender does not break even at
s = sFB. As Us (Rl, Rh) is increasing in s, this implies that s∗ must be strictly higher than sFB.
Consequently, the local lender rejects projects with a low, but positive NPV.
Collateral allows the borrower to make repayments in excess of the project’s cash flow. There
are two alternatives: collateral can be added in the high cash-flow state (Rh > xh) or in the low
cash-flow state (Rl > xl). (Evidently, having both Rh > xh and Rl > xl is not feasible.) The
two alternatives differ in the way how they affect the local lender’s expected payoff at different
values of s. As ps is increasing in s, adding collateral in the low cash-flow state primarily
improves the local lender’s expected payoff from precisely those projects that–in the absence of
collateral–are inefficiently rejected. By contrast, adding collateral in the high cash-flow state
primarily improves the local lender’s expected payoff from high-NPV projects, i.e., projects that
she would accepted anyway. Hence, the optimal solution is to shift as much as possible of the
local lender’s payoff into the low cash-flow state and leave the borrower a positive payoff in the
high cash-flow state to satisfy his participation constraint. This maximizes the local lender’s
expected payoff from low-NPV projects, thus minimizing her privately optimal cutoff s∗ and
19We stipulate that in case of indifference, repayments are first made out of the project’s cash flow. The
repayment in the high cash-flow state, Rh, is implicitly defined by the binding participation constraint (4) after
inserting Rl = xl + C and the optimality condition Us∗(Rl, Rh) = k defining the cutoff s∗.
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pushing it as far down as possible towards the first-best cutoff sFB.
It proves convenient to rewrite the optimal repayment in the high cash-flow state Rh in terms
of an optimal interest rate r, where Rh := (1 + r)k. As the risk-free rate of interest is zero, r
is also the required risk premium. By Proposition 1, the optimal contract then consists of two
parameters: r and C.
Credit Market Equilibrium
Up to this point, we have assumed that the borrower’s outside option V is positive. As the
following proposition shows, this is indeed true in equilibrium.
Proposition 2. There exists a unique credit market equilibrium. At τ = 0, the borrower goes
to the local lender, which provides the borrower with an expected utility of V = µ − k > 0. At
τ = 1, borrowers who are accepted by the local lender stay with the local lender, while borrowers
who are rejected cannot obtain financing elsewhere.
Proof. See Appendix.
At τ = 0, the maximum the competitive credit market can offer is µ − k > 0, which is
the project’s NPV based on hard information.20 Due the local lender’s ability to screen out
negative-NPV projects, the local lender can create additional surplus over and above what is
created if the project is financed by the competitive credit market, however. Consequently, the
local lender is able to outbid the competitive credit market. By standard arguments, the unique
equilibrium is where the local lender exactly matches the competitive credit market’s offer and
the borrower goes to the local lender.
Our notion that the local lender can successfully outbid the competitive credit market is
consistent with Petersen and Rajan’s (1994) observation that 95 percent of the smallest firms
in their sample borrow from a single bank. As the median distance between banks and small-
business borrowers in the United States is (only) four miles (Petersen and Rajan (2002)), this
will typically be a local lender.
20Like the local lender, the competitive credit market makes offers conditional on the project being approved.
As the competitive credit market evaluates projects solely on the basis of hard information, and as the NPV
based on this information is positive, the borrower rationally anticipates that the competitive credit market will
approve his project, which provides him with an expected utility of V = µ− k.
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While the competitive credit market cannot outbid the local lender, its existence nonetheless
puts pressure on the local lender to leave the borrower a share of the surplus. This distorts the
local lender’s credit decision, which in turn provides a role for collateral. By contrast, if there
was no competitive pressure–e.g., if the credit market is perfectly monopolistic–we would have
V = 0.21 The local lender could then keep the full project cash flow, which yields the first best.
Consider next interim competition at τ = 1. Given that the borrower is rejected with positive
probability, the fact that his ex-ante expected utility equals V > 0 implies that his expected
utility conditional on being accepted must strictly exceed V . The competitive credit market
cannot offer more than V , however.22 Accordingly, not only does the competitive credit market
lose against the local lender at τ = 0, it also loses in the interim competition at τ = 1. But if
accepted borrowers stay with the local lender, the only borrowers who might potentially visit
the competitive credit market are rejected borrowers. As we show in the Proof of Proposition 2
in the Appendix, such borrowers have a negative expected NPV, implying that the competitive
credit market is better off not making any positive offer at τ = 1.23
Optimal Credit Decision and Financial Contract: Equilibrium Values
Having shown that V = µ − k > 0, we can finally solve for the optimal level of collateral.
There are two subcases. In one subcase, the borrower has insufficient pledgeable assets. In
this case, the optimal contract requires that he pledges all his assets as collateral. In the other
subcase, the borrower has sufficient pledgeable assets to attain the first best. In this case, there
exists a unique first-best optimal collateral CFB and interest rate rFB, where CFB and rFB are
jointly determined by the borrower’s binding participation constraint (4) with V = µ − k and
the optimality condition
psFB (1 + rFB)k + (1− psFB )(xl +CFB) = k, (5)
21A perfectly monopolistic credit market alone does not ensure that V = 0. It must additionally hold that the
borrower has no bargaining power.
22Even an offer of V is sustainable only under the “most optimistic beliefs” that–in addition to all rejected
borrowers–also all accepted borrowers will switch from the local lender to the competitive credit market. (Any
offer by the credit market that attracts accepted borrower will inevitably attract all rejected borrowers.)
23See Rajan (1992) for a similar argument.
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where psFB is defined in (1). Solving these two equations yields
CFB =
(k − xl)(µ− k)R 1
sFB
(µs − k)f(s)ds
(6)
and
rFB =
1
k
∙
xh − CFB
xh − k
k − xl
¸
− 1. (7)
The following proposition summarizes our results.
Proposition 3. If the borrower has pledgeable assets w ≥ CFB, the first best can be attained
with an optimal contract (rFB, CFB) defined in (6)-(7).
If w < CFB the local lender is inefficiently conservative and denies credit to low-, but
positive-NPV projects. The optimal contract then stipulates that C = w, i.e., the borrower must
pledge all his assets as collateral.24
Proof. See Appendix.
The case where the first best can be attained shows that there is a limit to how “flat”
the optimal repayment schedule may be. Even if the borrower has sufficient pledgeable assets,
the repayment in the low cash-flow state is at most xl + CFB, which is strictly less than the
corresponding repayment in the high cash-flow state (1 + rFB)k.25
Renegotiations
If the borrower has insufficient pledgeable assets, the local lender’s accept or reject decision
is inefficient: if s ∈ [sFB, s∗) , the local lender rejects the project even though its NPV is positive.
This potentially creates scope for mutually beneficial renegotiations: rather than being denied
credit, the borrower might propose a new, more favorable contract allowing the local lender to
at least break even. This is precisely what would happen if s was observable, in which case
mutually beneficial renegotiations would eliminate all inefficiencies.
24See footnote 19 on how to compute the optimal interest rate r = (Rh/k)−1 in the second-best case w < CFB.
25Formally, the wedge between the first best repayment in the high and low cash-flow state is
(1 + rFB)k − (xl + CFB) = k − xl − (xh − k)
R sFB
0
(µs − k)f(s)dsR 1
sFB
(µs − k)f(s)ds
,
which is strictly positive as xh > k > xl and µs − k > 0 for all s > sFB while µs − k < 0 for all s < sFB .
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Given that only the local lender observes s, however, such mutually beneficial renegotiations
must fail: anticipating that the borrower will propose a more favorable contract, the local lender
has every incentive to claim that her assessment of the project is low–i.e., that s ∈ [sFB, s∗)–
even when it is actually high. From the borrower’s perspective, this implies that he will not
know if s ∈ [sFB, s∗) , in which case he would be willing to offer a more favorable contract, or if
s ≥ s∗, in which case offering a more favorable contract merely constitutes a wealth transfer to
the local lender. As we show below, the expected gain to the borrower from renegotiating the
optimal contract is strictly negative.
We consider the following renegotiation game. After the local lender has evaluated the
borrower’s project, but before she makes a decision, a new contract can be offered. (As the
local lender can always reverse her decision, it is actually irrelevant whether a decision has been
made or not.) If the local lender proposes a new contract, the borrower must agree, while if the
borrower proposes a new contract, the local lender must agree. The following proposition shows
that the optimal contract defined in Propositions 1 and 3 is renegotiation-proof.
Proposition 4. Regardless of who can propose a new contract in the renegotiation game, the
optimal contract in Propositions 1 and 3 will not be renegotiated.
Proof. See Appendix.
4 Comparative Analysis
When we refer to the borrower as having either sufficient or insuffient pledgeable assets, we
are referring to the two subcases w ≥ CFB and w < CFB in Proposition 3. The empirical
implications of this section are summarized in Section 5.
Variations in Pledgeable Assets
Proposition 3 shows that if w < CFB the local lender’s accept or reject decision is inefficient.
The following proposition completes this picture by showing that, in this case, an increase in the
borrower’s pledgeable assets lowers local lender’s cutoff s∗, thus improving the credit likelihood
1− F (s∗) and mitigating the inefficiency. Evidently, in the first-best case w ≥ CFB an increase
in pledgeable assets has no effect.
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Proposition 5. If the borrower has insufficient pledgeable assets, an increase in his pledgeable
assets implies that he can post more collateral, thus improving the credit likelihood.
Proof. See Appendix.
The probability that x = xl conditional on the project being accepted is
D :=
Z 1
s∗
(1− ps)
f(s)
1− F (s∗)ds, (8)
where f(s)/[1 − F (s∗)] is the density of s conditional on s ≥ s∗. Hence, D is the expected,
or average, default probability of an accepted borrower. Given that the average quality of the
pool of accepted borrowers increases with s∗, the expected default probability D increases with
the acceptance probability 1− F (s∗). In conjunction with the above result that the acceptance
probability increases with the posted collateral, this yields the following result.26
Corollary 1. Conditional on the loan being accepted, the expected default probability of a loan
is increasing in the posted collateral.
The intuition is straightforward. The average quality of accepted borrowers under a lenient
credit policy is lower than under a conservative credit policy. As collateral makes the local lender
more lenient, the average quality of accepted borrowers decreases with the collateral.
Variations in Observable Project Risk
Corollary 1 concerns ex-post default risk. While the true success probability ps is only ob-
servable by the local lender, knowing the collateral and whether or not the project was accepted
allows outsides to draw inferences about ps. This is what Corollary 1 is about.
This subsection concerns variations in observable ex-ante risk. Precisely, we consider a mean-
preserving spread in the project’s ex-ante cash-flow distribution and examine its effect on the
required collateral, risk premium, and credit likelihood.
There are two subcases. If the borrower has sufficient pledgeable assets, the increase in risk
can be fully absorbed by an increase in both the required collateral and the interest rate. As
a consequence, the credit likelihood remains first-best optimal. If the borrower has insufficient
26By Proposition 3, only collateral values of C ≤ CFB will be posted in equilibrium. For all C < CFB, the
acceptance probability 1− F (s∗) is strictly increasing in C.
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pledgeable assets, this is not possible. To protect herself against the increased likelihood of
making a loss, the local lender becomes more conservative.
Proposition 6. Consider a mean-preserving spread in the project’s cash-flow distribution. If the
borrower has sufficient pledgeable assets, the increase in project risk can be absorbed by increasing
both the required collateral and the risk premium. The credit likelihood remains unaffected.
If the borrower is unable to pledge more collateral, the credit likelihood decreases.
Proof. See Appendix.
Variations in Project Size
To compare projects of different sizes, we multiply the investment outlay and all cash flows
by a scaling factor α. Incidentally, while a higher α implies a greater loan size, the first-best
cutoff sFB is invariant with respect to α : given that µs := psFBαxh + (1− psFB)αxl = αk, the
scaling factor α cancels out. We have the following result.
Proposition 7. Consider an increase in the project–and thus in the loan–size. If the borrower
has sufficient pledgeable assets, the increase in loan size goes hand in hand with an increase in
the required collateral. The credit likelihood remains unaffected.
If the borrower is unable to pledge more collateral, the credit likelihood decreases.
Proof. See Appendix.
If the borrower has sufficient pledgeable assets, all that changes is the collateral, namely,
from CFB to αCFB, which implies it increases with the loan size. By contrast, the risk premium
remains unchanged: as the investment outlay is now αk, the first-best repayment in the high
cash-flow state is (1 + rFB)αk. Hence, even if rFB is unchanged, the repayment in the high
cash-flow state increases by a multiple α. As both the investment size αk and the repayment
in the low cash-flow state αxl + αCFB increase by the same multiple, first-best optimality is
preserved.
Intuitively, the local lender has more at stake when granting a bigger loan. In particular,
her loss in the low cash-flow state is αk− (αxl +C), which is increasing in α. One way to avoid
becoming more conservative is to increase the collateral requirement by the same multiple α. If
this is not possible, e.g., because the borrower has already pledged all his assets, the local lender
lowers the credit likelihood.
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Variations in the Cost of Borrowing from Distant Lenders
Suppose borrowing from the competitive credit market comes at a cost of κ. One inter-
pretation is that κ reflects the cost of traveling to, or doing business with, distant lenders.
Alternatively, κ may reflect greater monitoring expenses by distant lenders. In the first case, κ
is directly incurred by the borrower. In the second case, κ is initially incurred by the competi-
tive credit market but will be ultimately passed on to the borrower. Either way, the borrower’s
expected utility from going to the competitive credit market decreases to V = µ − k − κ. We
assume that κ is sufficiently small, so that V remains positive.
Empirical studies (e.g., Petersen and Rajan (2002)) suggest that–primarily due to advances
in information technology–the cost of borrowing from distant lenders has decreased over time,
thus putting greater pressure on incumbent lenders.The following proposition examines the
implications of a decrease in κ.
Proposition 8. Consider a decrease in the cost of borrowing from distant lenders. If the
borrower has sufficient pledgeable assets, the local lender responds to the increase in competitive
pressure by distant lenders by requesting more collateral.
If the borrower is unable to pledge more collateral, the credit likelihood decreases.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition follows directly from (5). A decrease in the cost of borrowing from distant
lenders makes the credit market more competitive, thereby lowering the interest rate. If the
borrower is unable to post more collateral, the local lender no longer breaks even at her original
cutoff s∗, which implies this cutoff must increase. On the other hand, if the borrower has
sufficient pledgeable assets, the increase in s∗ can be avoided by requesting more collateral.
5 Empirical Implications
This section summarizes the empirical implications of our model. The first implication follows
directly from Proposition 5.
Implication 1. Low net-worth firms should face a higher likelihood of being denied credit than
high net-worth firms.
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Low net-worth firms are firms with few liquid or tangible assets, or highly indebted firms.
Such firms possess relatively few pledgeable assets, implying that they will face a higher likeli-
hood of being denied credit than high net-worth firms.27
The next implication concerns the relation between collateral and ex-post default risk.
Implication 2. Controlling for ex-ante observable differences in borrower risk, the expected
default probability of a loan should be increasing in the pledged collateral.
Implication 2 is a restatement of Corollary 1, which argues that–holding ex-ante observable
borrower risk constant–loans with a higher collateral are more likely to default ex post. The
intuition is that collateral makes lenders more lenient in their accept decisions, which implies
that it reduces the average quality within the pool of accepted borrowers.
Jiménez and Saurina (2004) and Jiménez, Salas, and Saurina (2004)–using data from over
three million Spanish loans–test the relation between collateral and ex-post default risk. Con-
sistent with Implication 2, they find that the presence of collateral significantly increases the
default likelihood in the year after the loan has been granted. Similarly, Berger and Udell
(1990)–using charge-offs and past dues as proxies for default risk–also find that collateral is
positively correlated with the likelihood of default.
The next implication concerns differences in ex-ante observable borrower risk. It follows
from Proposition 6.
Implication 3. High-risk borrowers should post more collateral and pay a higher risk premium
than low-risk borrowers.
A general difficulty in testing Implication 3 is to find a good proxy for ex-ante borrower risk.28
Empirical studies have used a number of different risk proxies. However, all of them appear to
find a positive relation between borrower risk and collateral (e.g., Orgler (1970), Hester (1979),
Leeth and Scott (1989), Berger and Udell (1995), Strahan (1999), Dennis, Nandy, and Sharpe
(2000), Jiménez, Salas, and Saurina (2004), Gonas, Highfield, and Mullineaux (2004)).29
27Most theoretical models of collateral assume that borrowers have unlimited pledgeable net worth. An excep-
tion is Besanko and Thakor (1987a).
28See Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991), who “wish to caution that any statements about observed cross-sectional
relationships between borrower risk and collateral are sensitive to the risk measures employed.”
29Orgler (1970) uses loan classifications by bank managers as a proxy; Hester (1979) uses various accounting
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Implication 3 also suggests that collateral and risk premia should go hand in hand. Berger
and Udell (1990) find strong evidence for a positive relation between collateral and risk premia.
They interpet their finding as suggesting that high-risk borrowers post more collateral than low
risk-borrowers. However, underlying this interpretation is the assumption that risk premia are
positively correlated with borrower risk. Proposition 6 in this paper endogenizes this assumption.
Other studies that find a positive relation between collateral and risk premia are Booth (1992),
Angbazo, Mei, and Saunders (1998), Strahan (1999), and Dennis, Nandy, and Sharpe (2000),
while Degryse and Ongena (2003) find a negative relation.
We next turn to the relation between loan size and collateral. Proposition 7 is based on a
simple intuition: if the investment outlay increases, the local lender makes a bigger loss if the
project cash flow is low. To protect herself against this bigger loss, she raises the collateral
requirement.30
Implication 4. An increase in loan size should result in an increase in the required collateral.
The empirical evidence is both sparse and mixed. Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991) find that
larger loans are less likely to be secured, while Leeth and Scott (1989) and Jiménez, Salas, and
Saurina (2004) find that larger loans are more likely to be secured.31 However, all these studies
consider the incidence of collateralization (yes/no), not the amount of collateral. We are not
aware of any study examining how the amount of collateral varies with the loan size.
Proposition 8 considers a reduction in the cost of borrowing from distant lenders. It argues
that in order to cushion the effects of an increase in competitive pressure by distant lenders, the
variables; Leeth and Scott (1989) use firm age; Berger and Udell (1995) use leverage and firm age; Strahan (1999)
uses firm size, leverage, opaqueness (i.e., market-to-book ratio), and credit ratings; Dennis, Nandy, and Sharpe
(2000) use Altman’s Z-Score and leverage; Jiménez, Salas, and Saurina (2004) use firm age and whether or not the
firm has an existing loan in default at the time when the new loan is granted; Gonas, Highfield, and Mullineaux
(2004) use credit ratings.
30Note that–while the absolute amount of collateral increases proportionately with the loan size–the fraction
of the loan that is secured is independent of the loan size in our model.
31Jiménez, Salas, and Saurina find that both the likelihood that the loan is secured at all and that it is secured
on a 100 percent basis is increasing with the loan size, which is consistent with Implication 4. They also find that
an increase in loan size increases the relative likelihood of 50 percent versus 100 percent collateralization. This
latter finding is consistent with our model if borrowers can fully meet thecollateral requirement for smaller loans,
but not necessarily the (much higher) collateral requirement for large loans (i.e., C ≤ w becomes binding).
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local lender will raise the collateral requirement.
Implication 5. An increase in credit market competition should result in an increase in the
required collateral.
The relation between credit market competition and collateral has received little attention
in empirical research. To our knowledge, the only empirical study addressing this issue is a
recent paper by Jiménez, Salas, and Saurina (2004). Consistent with Implication 5, they find a
positive relation between collateral and competition (measured by the Herfindahl index).
Our final implication concerns situations in which the borrower cannot meet demands by
the lender to post more collateral. In this case, the credit likelihood decreases.
Implication 6. The likelihood of being denied credit should be increasing in the loan size,
ex-ante borrower risk, and degree of credit market competition.
It is difficult to find a good proxy for credit rationing. Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995)
argue that firms extending trade credit past the due date–thereby incurring high costs and
penalties–are likely to suffer from credit rationing. Consistent with Implication 6, they find
that the availability of credit to small- and medium-sized firms is lower in more competitive
credit markets. Relatedly, Zarutskie (2004) finds that firms in less competitive credit markets
are more likely both to receive debt and to receive debt more quickly. We are not aware of
empirical studies examining the effects of borrower risk and loan size on credit rationing.
Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard
Let us briefly review some of the main implications from asymmetric information and moral
hazard theories of collateral.
Asymmetric Information
(Pure) borrower asymmetric information models (e.g., Bester (1985), Chan and Kanatas
(1987), Besanko and Thakor (1987a, b)) predict that high-risk borrowers post less collateral
than low-risk borrowers, which is difficult to reconcile with the empirical evidence listed in
connection with Implication 3.
Moral Hazard
The basic argument why collateral alleviates borrower moral hazard is both simple and
intuitive. Collateral constitutes a bond that is forfeited in bad (i.e., low cash-flow) states. As
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bad states are more likely if the borrower shirks–and less likely if he works hard–posting
collateral improves the borrower’s incentives to work hard (e.g., Chan and Thakor (1987); Boot,
Thakor, and Udell (1991); Boot and Thakor (1994)). In equilibrium, borrowers who can post
more collateral work harder, which reduces the likelihood of bad states. Hence, the basic moral
hazard intuition suggests a negative relation between collateral and ex-post default risk, which
is the opposite of our Implication 2.
The above argument assumes that there is only one type of borrower quality. If there are
many quality types, Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991) show that it may be nontrivial to obtain a
robust empirical prediction.32 If borrower quality and effort are substitutes, collateral and risk
(both in the ex-ante and ex-post sense) may be positively related, like in Implications 2 and
3 above.33 However, if borrower quality and effort are complements, collateral and risk may
be negatively related. Hence, the empirical prediction depends critically on whether high- or
low-quality borrowers have a higher marginal productivity of effort. Given that it is difficult
to argue which is true empirically, it is probably fair to say that Implications 2 and 3 do not
necessarily (in the sense of a robust empirical prediction) follow from moral hazard arguments.34
6 Conclusion
This paper offers a novel, and we believe intuitive, theory of collateral based on the notion
that lenders make discretionary credit decisions that are inefficiently conservative. Our theory
is entirely lender-based and assumes no borrower moral hazard or private information. This
implies, among other things, that it applies to owner-managed firms as well as firms in which
ownership and management are separated.
The basic argument is simple. If there is credit market competition, or if the borrower
has some bargaining power, the lender must leave the borrower a share of the created surplus,
32See also Chan and Thakor (1987).
33Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991, Proposition 2) provide sufficient conditions ensuring that low-quality bor-
rowers have both a higher ex-ante risk and a higher default risk than high-quality borrowers. If these conditions
fail to hold, collateral and risk may be negatively related even if borrower quality and effort are susbtitutes, but
positively related if they are complements.
34Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991) also show that borrower moral hazard implies a negative relation between
loan size and collateral, which is the opposite of our Implication 4.
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implying that she cannot keep the full project cash flow for herself. As the lender provides
the full investment outlay, this implies that she only accepts projects whose expected cash flow
exceeds the investment outlay by a sufficient margin. As a consequence, the lender rejects low-,
but positive NPV projects.
Collateral makes the lender more willing to accept the borrower’s project, thus alleviating
her conservative bias. In particular, adding collateral in low cash-flow states produces the
greatest “bang for the buck”: as low-NPV projects have a relatively high likelihood of low cash-
flow states, adding collateral in these states improves the lender’s payoff from precisely those
projects that are inefficiently rejected.
At the heart of our model is a multitasking problem: the lender provides financing and
assesses the borrower’s credit risk. The fact that the lender provides financing prevents her
from truthfully revealing the outcome of her credit risk assessment. The fact that the credit
risk assessment cannot be contracted upon, in turn, distorts the lender’s decision to provide
financing. In our model, we take the fact that the lender performs both tasks as given and
examine its implications for the optimal credit decision and collateral. In practice, banks do
typically perform both tasks jointly. Especially for small- and medium-sized loans, the reason
might be a simple cost argument. Given the relatively small margins on such loans, combining
both activities under one roof saves on valuable fixed costs.35.
7 Appendix A: Continuum of Cash Flows
This section shows that our argument for why collateral is optimal extends to a continuum of
cash flows. Unlike the two cash-flow model in the main text, it not only shows that collateral
is used in low cash-flow states, but also how precisely repayments out of the pledged assets are
made as a function of the project’s cash flow if cash flow is a continuous variable.
We assume that the project cash flow x is distributed with atomless CDF Gs(x) over the
support X := [0, x], where x > 0 can be either finite or infinite. The density gs(x) is everywhere
35“A $50,000 loan yielding three percent over cost of funds provides only $1,500 p.a. in gross revenues, before
provisions of credit losses and allocation of overheads. This level of gross revenue can pay for very little of the
loan officer’s analytical and monitoring time” (Saunders and Thomas (2001)). The average loan size in Petersen
and Rajan’s (2002) sample of small-business loans is $18,000.
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continuous and positive. If x is infinite, we assume that µs :=
R
X xgs(x)dx exists for all s ∈ [0, 1].
We assume that Gs(x) satisfies MLRP, which states that for any pair (s, s0) ∈ S with s0 > s,
the ratio gs0(x)/gs(x) is strictly increasing in x for all x ∈ X.
With a continuum of cash flows, a contract specifies a repayment schedule t(x) ≤ x out of
the project’s cash flow, an amount C ≤ w of collateral, and a repayment schedule c(x) ≤ C
out of the pledged assets. It is convenient to write R(x) := t(x) + c(x). We make the standard
assumption that R(x) is nondecreasing for all x ∈ X (e.g., Innes (1990)). The local lender’s
and borrower’s expected payoffs are Us(R) :=
R
X R(x)gs(x)dx, Vs(R) := µs − Us(R), U(R) :=R 1
s∗ [Us (R)−k]f(s)ds and V (R) :=
R 1
s∗ Vs(R)f(s)ds, respectively. Analogous to the main text, the
local lender’s privately optimal cutoff is given by the optimality condition Us∗(R)(R) = k. The
local lender’s program is to maximize U(R) subject to the borrower’s participation constraint
V (R) ≥ V .
The following result extends Proposition 1 to the case with a continuum of cash flows.
Proposition. With a continuum of cash flows, the optimal financial contract stipulates a
repayment R ∈ (0, x) and collateral C ∈ (0, w] such that the local lender receives R(x) = x+ C
if x ≤ R and R(x) = R if x > R.
As for repayments made out of the project’s cash flow, we have that t(x) = x for x ≤ R and
t(x) = R for x > R. Collateral is used as follows: if x ≤ R−C, the local lender receives the full
collateral, i.e., c(x) = C, if R−C < x ≤ R, the local lender receives a fraction c(x) = R−x of the
collateralized assets (after liquidation), while if x > R, the local lender receives no repayment
out of the collateralized assets because the project cash flow itself is sufficient to make the
contractually required repayment.
To prove the proposition, suppose to the contrary that the optimal contract stipulated a
repayment scheme R(x) that is different from that in the proposition. We can then construct a
new repayment scheme eR(x) = minnx+ eC, eRo where eC = w, and where eR satisfiesZ 1
s∗(R)
∙Z
X
z(x)gs(x)dx
¸
f(s)ds = 0, (9)
with z(x) := eR(x) − R(x). (Hence, holding the cutoff fixed at s∗(R), expected payoffs remain
constant.)36 By construction of eR(x), there exists a value 0 < ex < x such that z(x) ≥ 0 holds
36Existence and uniqueness of a value eR solving (9) follows as i) the local lender’s payoff is continuous and
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for all x < ex and z(x) ≤ 0 holds for all x > ex, where the inequalities hold strictly on sets of
positive measure.
Claim 1. s∗( eR) < s∗(R).
Proof. By (9) and continuity of gs(x) in s, there exists a value es satisfying s∗(R) < es < 1,
where
R
X z(x)ges(x)dx = 0. From es > s∗(R) and MLRP it follows that gs∗(R)(x)/ges(x) is strictly
decreasing in x such thatZ
X
z(x)gs∗(R)(x)dx =
Z
x≤ex z(x)ges(x)
gs∗(R)(x)
ges(x) dx+
Z
x>ex z(x)ges(x)
gs∗(R)(x)
ges(x) dx
>
gs∗(R)(ex)
ges(ex)
Z
X
z(x)ges(x)dx = 0.
As
R
X z(x)gs∗(R)(x)dx > 0 and
R
X R(x)gs∗(R)(x)dx = k from the definition of s
∗(R), we have
that
R
X
eR(x)gs∗(R)(x)dx > k. As Us( eR) is strictly increasing in s, we have that s∗( eR) < s∗(R).
Q.E.D.
Note that the new cutoff s∗( eR) may lie below sFB. In this case, we can make the following
adjustment:
Claim 2. In case s∗( eR) < sFB for eC = w, we can adjust the new contract by decreasing eC and
increasing eR such that (9) continues to hold, while s∗( eR) = sFB.
Proof. Take first some contract ( bR, bC) such that bR > eR and bC < eC and (9) holds with
z(x) := bR(x)− eR(x). From (9)–together with bR > eR and bC < eC–it follows that there exists
a value 0 < ex < x such that z(x) ≥ 0 holds for all x > ex and z(x) ≤ 0 holds for all x < ex, where
the inequalities are strict on sets of positive measure. By the argument in Claim 1, this implies
that s∗( bR) > s∗( eR). As we decrease bC and adjust bR accordingly to satisfy (9), we have from
the definition of s∗ and continuity of gs(x) that s∗( bR) increases continuously. As s∗( bR) > sFB
at bC = 0, the claim follows. Q.E.D.
We show next that the borrower is not worse off under the new contract ( eR, eC).
Claim 3. V ( eR) ≥ V (R).
Proof. We can distinguish between three cases.
Case 1: s∗(R) = sFB. The assertion follows immediately from (9) and s∗(R) = s∗( eR).
strictly increasing in eR for a given cutoff, and ii) the left-hand side of (9) is strictly positive at eR = x and strictly
negative at eR = 0.
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Case 2: s∗(R) > sFB. In this case, construction of eR(x) implies that sFB ≤ s∗( eR) < s∗(R). It
also follows from the construction of eR(x) that the borrower’s expected payoff remains unchanged
if the loan is approved if and only if s ≥ s∗(R). Hence, V ( eR) ≥ V (R) follows if Vs( eR) ≥ 0 for
all s ∈ [s∗( eR), s∗(R)]. To see that this is the case, note first that V
s∗( eR)( eR) ≥ 0 holds because
of U
s∗( eR)( eR) = 0 and sFB ≤ s∗( eR). It thus remains to show that Vs( eR) is nondecreasing in s.
Partial integration yields
Vs( eR) = Z xeR− eC [1−Gs(x)] dx− eC. (10)
MLRP implies that Gs(x) is strictly decreasing in s for all 0 < x < x. By (10), this implies that
Vs( eR) is strictly increasing in s.
Case 3: s∗(R) < sFB. In this case, construction of eR(x) implies that s∗( eR) = sFB. It
remains to show that Vs( eR) ≤ 0 for all s ∈ [s∗( eR), sFB]. From s∗( eR) = sFB–implying that
UsFB(
eR) = 0–it follows that VsFB ( eR) = 0, while the argument in Case 2 implies that Vs( eR) is
nondecreasing in s. Together, this implies that Vs( eR) ≤ 0 for all s ∈ [s∗( eR), sFB]. Q.E.D.
Summing up, we have constructed a new contract ( eR, eC) with the following characteristics:
i) eR(x) = minnx+ eC, eRo; ii) (9) is satisfied; iii) if s∗(R) ≥ sFB, it holds that sFB ≤ s∗( eR) ≤
s∗(R), where s∗( eR) < s∗(R) if s∗(R) > sFB; iv) if s∗(R) < sFB, it holds that s∗(R) < s∗( eR) =
sFB; v) V ( eR) ≥ V (R). The new contract is thus acceptable for the borrower and does not make
the lender worse off. In fact, the lender is strictly better off if s∗( eR) 6= s∗(R), which follows
immediately from (9) and optimality of s∗. Finally, if the original contract implements the first-
best cutoff, i.e., if s∗( eR) = s∗(R) = sFB, the transfer made out of collateralized assets is strictly
lower under the new contract, i.e.,
R 1
sFB
£R
X c(x)gs(x)dx
¤
f(s)ds >
R 1
sFB
£R
X ec(x)gs(x)dx¤ f(s)ds.
Q.E.D.
8 Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Define
Vs(Rl, Rh) : = (1− ps)(xl −Rl) + ps(xh −Rh),
V (Rl,Rh) : =
Z 1
s∗
Vs(Rl, Rh)f(s)ds.
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Hence, V (Rl,Rh) is the borrower’s expected payoff at τ = 0, while Vs(Rl, Rh) is his expected
payoff at τ = 1 conditional on s. We show that there exist unique optimal values of Rl and Rh,
and that these values satisfy xl < Rl ≤ xl+w and Rl < Rh < xh. The following observations are
obvious: (i) if we increase Rl while holding Rh constant, U(Rl,Rh) increases while s∗ decreases,
(ii) if we increase Rh while holding Rl constant, U(Rl, Rh) increases while s∗ decreases, and (iii)
s∗ changes continuously with Rl and Rh, implying that V (Rl,Rh) and U(Rl, Rh) also change
continuously.
Next, suppose we increase Rl and adjust Rh so as to keep s∗ constant, i.e., we compare two
contracts with eRl > Rl, eRh < Rh, and
ps∗ =
k −Rl
Rh −Rl
=
k − eRleRh − eRl , (11)
where (11) is adapted from (2). Then it holds that V ( eRl, eRh) > V (Rl, Rh). This is immediate
as s∗ stays constant, while strict monotonicity of ps, eRl > Rl, and eRh < Rh implies that
Vs( eRl, eRh) > Vs(Rl, Rh) for all s > s∗. Recall next that, by optimality, the local lender chooses
a contract implementing the lowest feasible cutoff s∗ ≥ sFB while satisfying the borrower’s
participation constraint (4). To complete the proof of Proposition 1, we distinguish between the
following cases.
Case 1: s∗ = sFB. If it is possible to achieve the first best, we argue first that this implies
Rl > xl. By (1) and (2) we have that s∗ = sFB holds if
k −Rl
Rh −Rl
=
k − xl
xh − xl
. (12)
Suppose first that Rl = xl. In this case, (12) implies that Rh = xh, which implies that
V (Rl,Rh) = 0, violating (4). Suppose next, we decrease Rl so that Rl < xl and adjust Rh accord-
ingly to satisfy s∗ = sFB. By our previous arguments, V (Rl, Rh) then decreases to V (Rl,Rh) < 0,
again violating (4). Hence, to satisfy (4) it must hold that Rl > x. Uniqueness of (Rl, Rh) fol-
lows from the same argument. If s∗ = sFB is feasible, we thus have shown that there is a unique
optimal contract with xl < Rl ≤ xl + w and Rl < Rh < xh.
Case 2. s∗ > sFB. We claim that in this case, optimality implies that Rl = xl + w. Suppose
that this was not true, i.e., that s∗ > sFB and Rl < xl + w. By our previous arguments,
there then exists a contract with eRl > Rl, eRh < Rh, s∗( eRl, eRh) = s∗(Rl, Rh) = s∗, and
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Vs( eRl, eRh) > Vs(Rl, Rh) for all s > s∗. That is, under ( eRl, eRh) the borrower’s participation
constraint is relaxed. This in turn allows to adjust ( eRl, eRh) by increasing either one (or both)
repayment until (4) binds again. Denote this contract by ( eR0l, eR0h). (Existence follows from the
fact that all payoffs change continuously in eRl and eRh.) For the contract ( eR0l, eR0h), we then have
that s∗( eR0l, eR0h) < s∗(Rl, Rh). As we can adjust the contract–and thereby s∗–continuously, we
can choose ( eR0l, eR0h) such that s∗( eR0l, eR0h) ≥ sFB. As the new cutoff is more efficient and the
borrower’s participation constraint is satisfied with equality, the new contract must make the
lender strictly better off, contradiction. Given that Rl = xl+w, Rh is also uniquely pinned down:
it is the maximum feasible value at which (4) binds. (Existence follows again from continuity of
all payoffs in Rh.)
Case 3. s∗ < sFB. By the arguments in Case 2, we can rule out Case 3 as it is always possible
to obtain a higher and more efficient cutoff s∗. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. In a slight change of notation, we abbreviate expected payoffs by
Vs(r, C), V (r, C), Us(r,C), and U(r,C) respectively. Given the arguments in the main text, it
remains to show that rejected borrowers have a negative average NPV.
Claim 1. If the local lender’s offer attracts the borrower in τ = 0, a rejected borrower can not
obtain financing from the competitive credit market in τ = 1 as his (expected) NPV is negative.
Proof. We argue to a contradiction and suppose that there is an equilibrium in which the local
lender’s offer (r, C) attracts the borrower, while a rejected borrower can still obtain financing
by the competitive credit market in τ = 1. To sustain this equilibrium, it must hold thatZ s∗
0
[µs − k]
f(s)
1− F (s∗)ds ≥ 0. (13)
Given that the credit market is perfectly competitive, all of the surplus, i.e., the left-hand side
of (13), accrues to the borrower. To attract the borrower in τ = 0, the local lender’s offer must
thus satisfy Z s∗
0
[µs − k]f(s)ds+
Z 1
s∗
Vs(r, C)f(s)ds ≥ µ− k =
Z 1
0
[µs − k] f(s)ds,
implying that Z 1
s∗
Vs(r, C)f(s)ds ≥
Z 1
s∗
[µs − k] f(s)ds. (14)
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However, k(1 + r) > xl + C–which is necessary for the loan to be approved with positive
probability–implies that Us(r, C) > 0 for all s > s∗, contradicting (14). Q.E.D.
Proof of Propositions 3 and 5. We already know that w = 0 implies s∗ > sFB. Moreover,
from the Proof of Proposition 1 we have that s∗ > sFB implies C = w whenever w > 0, while
a marginal increase in C = w allows to strictly reduce s∗. Finally, by definition, s∗ = sFB is
feasible if and only if w ≥ CFB, in which case it holds that C = CFB. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. We can restrict ourselves to the case where s∗ > sFB. We make
use of the following result from the Proof of Proposition 1: If (Rl, Rh) is the (unique) optimal
contract and ( eRl, eRh) is some other contract with Vs( eRl, eRh) ≤ Vs(Rl, Rh) for some s = es < s,
then it must hold for all s > es that Vs( eRl, eRh) < Vs(Rl, Rh).
Suppose first the borrower would make a new offer ( eRl, eRh). For this offer to be profitable, it
must hold that s∗( eRl, eRh) ≤ s∗(Rl, Rh), which–by the definition of s∗ and previous argument–
implies that Us( eRl, eRh) > Us(Rl, Rh) for all s > s∗( eRl, eRh). Consequently, the borrower’s
expected payoff from the new offer is just V ( eRl, eRh). By optimality of (Rl, Rh) and s∗( eRl, eRh) ≤
s∗(Rl, Rh), this implies that V ( eRl, eRh) < V (Rl, Rh) = V , which in turn implies that offering
( eRl, eRh) cannot be profitable for the borrower. The argument where the local lender makes a
new offer, which results in a game of signaling, is analogous. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6. We consider a (marginal) shift in the borrower’s riskiness. We denote
the characteristics of the more risky borrower by bxl, bxh, and bps for all s ∈ S. Note that by the
mean-preserving spread (MPS) we have bxl ≤ xl and bxh ≥ xh, where at least one inequality must
hold strictly. Also, the first-best cutoffsFB remains unchanged and we have ps =
µs−xl
xh−xl andbps = µs−bxlbxh−bxl . We denote the respective optimal contracts by (r, C) and (br, bC) and the respective
cutoffs by s∗ and bs∗.
We first consider the case where w > CFB such that following a (marginal) increase in
riskiness we have s∗ = bs∗ = sFB. We show that bC > C and br > r. Note first that
ps − bps = µs[(bxh − bxl)− (xh − xl)] + bxlxh − xlbxh
(xh − xl)(bxh − bxl) , (15)
which by the strict monotonicity of µs and bxh−bxl > xh−xl is strictly increasing in s. To ensure
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that s∗ = bs∗ = sFB, it must hold that
bpsFBk(1 + br) + (1− bpsFB )( bC + bxl) = psFBk(1 + r) + (1− psFB )(C + xl), (16)
while from (4) we obtain the requirementZ 1
sFB
hbps[bxh − k(1 + br)]− (1− bps) bCi f(s)ds (17)
=
Z 1
sFB
[ps[xh − k(1 + r)]− (1− ps)C] f(s)ds.
Dividing (17) by [1− F (sFB)] and using the MPS, this transforms to the requirementZ 1
sFB
hbpsk(1 + br) + (1− bps)( bC + bxl)i f(s)
1− F (sFB)
ds (18)
=
Z 1
sFB
[psk(1 + r) + (1− bps)(C + xl)] f(s)
1− F (sFB)
ds.
As ps − bps is strictly increasing from (15), (16) and (18) can only be jointly satisfied if
k(1 + br)− bC − bxl = k(1 + r)− C − xl. (19)
Given that psFB > bpsFB by the MPS, (19) and (16) jointly imply
bC + bxl > C + xl. (20)
From (20) and bxl ≤ xl by the MPS, it then follows that bC > C. Finally, (19) and (20) jointly
imply that k(1 + br) > k(1 + r) and thus that br > r.
Suppose next that w < CFB such that following a (marginal) increase in riskiness we have
s∗ > sFB and bs∗ > sFB, implyingC = bC = w from Propositions 1 and 3. We show that bs∗ > s∗.
We argue to a contradiction and suppose that bs∗ ≤ s∗. Define next er such that a contract
(C = er, w) for the less risky borrower leads to the cutoff es∗ = bs∗, i.e.,
pbs∗ [k(1 + er)− w − xl] + (w + xl) = bpbs∗ [k(1 + br)− w − bxl] + (w + bxl). (21)
We show now that under (er, w) the constraint (4) is relaxed, which by the MPS and es∗ = bs∗ is
indeed the case if Z 1
sFB
[bps[k(1 + br)−w − bxl] + (w + bxl)] f(s)
1− F (sFB)
ds (22)
<
Z 1
sFB
[ps[k(1 + er)−w − xl] + (w + xl)] f(s)
1− F (sFB)
ds.
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As ps−bps is strictly increasing from (15), (22) holds from (21). Given that (4) is relaxed, the
lender can further increase er and, thereby, decrease the respective cutoff es∗ until (4) binds. (Such
a contract exists from continuity of the borrower’s payoff in er.) This contradicts optimality of
the original contract (w, r) where s∗ > bs∗ > es∗.
Finally, we turn to the case where w = CFB. After a MPS the new threshold in (6) satisfiesbCFB ≥ CFB, which holds strictly if bxl < xl. In this case, it follows immediately from our
previous results that C = bC = w and bs∗ > s∗ = sFB. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7. Note first that the first-best cutoff does not depend on the size.
Moreover, we have s∗ = sFB if
(αxl + C) + psFB [αk(1 + r)− (αxl + C)] = αk, (23)
while a similar transformation and substitution of V = α(µ− k) yields from (4) thatZ 1
sFB
[ps[αxh − αk(1 + r) +C]− C] f(s)ds = α(µ− k). (24)
Denote next for two projects of sizes α < bα the respective optimal contracts by (r,C) and
(br, bC) and the respective cutoffs by s∗ and bs∗. We suppose again first that w > CFB such that
from continuity we have after a marginal change in size that s∗ = bs∗ = sFB. As ps is strictly
increasing, (23)-(24) can only hold jointly for α and bα in case br = r and bC/C = bα/α.
Suppose next that w < CFB, such that both C = bC = w. We show that it must then hold
that s∗ < bs∗. We argue to a contradiction and suppose that bs∗ ≤ s∗. Choose next for the project
of size α a value er together with C = w such that the cutoff is equal to bs∗, i.e.,
(αxl + w) + pbs∗ [αk(1 + er)− (αxl +w)]− αk (25)
= (bαxl + w) + pbs∗ [bαk(1 + br)− (bαxl +w)]− bαk.
We show now that (25) implies that under (er, C) the constraint (4) is not binding for the
smaller project, which yields a contradiction as we can further increase er and thereby ensure
that the lender applies an even more efficient cutoff. This holds ifZ 1
bs∗ [αµs − (αxl + w)− ps [αk(1 + er)− (αxl + w)]] f(s)ds > α(µ− k). (26)
Substituting the binding constraint (4) for bα and equation (25) reveals that (26) holds. In
the final case where w = CFB we have from (6) that the threshold does not depend on the
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project’s size, i.e., that bCFB = CFB. By the previous arguments this implies C = bC = w and
s∗ < bs∗ This completes the proof of Proposition 7. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8. With V = µ− k − κ the threshold (6) changes to
CFB :=
(k − xl)(µ− k − κ)R 1
sFB
(µs − k)f(s)ds
, (27)
which is strictly decreasing in κ. We consider a marginal decrease in the additional lending costs
κ. For κ > bκ denote the respective contracts by (r,C) and (br, bC) and the respective cutoffs by
s∗ and bs∗. In case w > CFB we have for a marginal reduction in costs that s∗ = bs∗ = sFB while
C = CFB and bC = bCFB with bCFB < CFB. In case w < CFB we have that C = bC = w andbs∗ > s∗ > sFB. To see that bs∗ > s∗, note that offering (r, C) if the competitive market has costs
κ leaves the borrower’s participation constraint (4) slack. By previous arguments this allows to
construct a new contract (br0, C) where (4) binds and the cutoff is strictly lower, contradicting
the optimality of the original contract (br, bC). Q.E.D.
9 References
Almazan, A., 2002, A Model of Competition in Banking: Bank Capital vs. Expertise, Journal
of Financial Intermediation 11, 87-121.
Angbazo, L.A., Mei, J., and Saunders, A., 1998, Credit Spreads in the Market for Highly
Leveraged Transaction Loans, Journal of Banking and Finance 22, 1249-1282.
Berger, A.N., and Udell, G.F., 1990, Collateral, Loan Quality, and Bank Risk, Journal of
Monetary Economics 25, 21-42.
Berger, A.N., and Udell, G.F., 1995, Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small Firms
Finance, Journal of Business 68, 351-381.
Berger, A.N., Klapper, L.F., and Udell, G.F., 2001, The Ability of Banks to Lend to Informa-
tionally Opaque Small Businesses, Journal of Banking and Finance 25, 2127-2167.
Besanko, D., and Thakor, A.V., 1987a, Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Mo-
nopolistic and Competitive Credit Markets, International Economic Review 28, 671-689.
32
Besanko, D., and Thakor, A.V., 1987b, Competitive Equilibrium in the Credit Market under
Asymmetric Information, Journal of Economic Theory 42, 167-182.
Bester, H., 1985, Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information,
American Economic Review 75, 850-855.
Boot, A.W.A., Thakor, A.V., and Udell, G.F., 1991, Secured Lending and Default Risk: Equi-
librium Analysis, Policy Implications and Empirical Results, Economic Journal 101, 458-
472.
Boot, A.W.A., and Thakor, A.V., 1994, Moral Hazard and Secured Lending in an Infinitely
Repeated Credit Market Game, International Economic Review 35, 899-920.
Boot, A.W.A., and Thakor, A.V., 2000, Can Relationship Banking Survive Competition? Jour-
nal of Finance 55, 679-713.
Booth, J.R., 1992, Contract Costs, Bank Loans, and the Cross-Monitoring Hypothesis, Journal
of Financial Economics 31, 25-42.
Broecker, T., 1990, Credit-Worthiness Tests and Interbank Competition, Econometrica 58,
429-452.
Brunner, A., Krahnen, J.P., and Weber, M., 2000, Information Production in Credit Rela-
tionships: On the Role of Internal Ratings in Commercial Banking, mimeo, University of
Frankfurt.
Chan, Y.-S., and Kanatas, G., 1985, Asymmetric Valuations and the Role of Collateral in Loan
Agreements, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 17, 84-95.
Chan, Y.-S., and Thakor, A.V., 1987, Collateral and Competitive Equilibria with Moral Hazard
and Private Information, Journal of Finance 42, 345-363.
Coco, G., 2000, On the Use of Collateral, Journal of Economic Surveys 14, 191-214.
Degryse, H., and Ongena, S., 2003, Distance, Lending Relationships, and Competition, Journal
of Finance, forthcoming.
33
Dell’Ariccia, G., and Marquez, R., 2004, Information and Bank Credit Allocation, Journal of
Financial Economics 72, 185-214.
Dennis, S., Nandy, D., and Sharpe, I.G., 2000, The Determinants of Contract Terms in Bank
Revolving Credit Agreements, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 35, 87-110.
Gonas, J.S., Highfield, M.J., and Mullineaux, D.J., 2004, When Are Commercial Loans Se-
cured?, Financial Review 39, 79-99.
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., and Zingales, L., 2004, Does Local Financial Development Matter?,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, 929-969.
Grunert, J., Norden, L., and Weber, M., 2002, The Role of Non-financial Factors in Internal
Credit Ratings, mimeo, University of Mannheim.
Hauswald, R., and Marquez, R., 2003, Information Technology and Financial Services Compe-
tition, Review of Financial Studies 16, 921-948.
Hester, D., 1979, Customer Relationships and Terms of Loans: Evidence from a Pilot Survey,
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 11, 349-357.
Inderst, R., and Müller, H.M, 2003, Credit Risk Analysis and Security Design, mimeo, New
York University.
Innes, R., 1990, Limited Liability and Incentive Contracting with Ex-ante Action Choices,
Journal of Economic Theory 52, 45-67.
Jappelli, T., and Pagano, M., 2002, Information Sharing, Lending and Defaults: Cross-Country
Evidence, Journal of Banking and Finance 26, 2017-2045.
Jiménez, G., and Saurina, J., 2004, Collateral, Type of Lender and Relationship Banking as
Determinants of Credit Risk, Journal of Banking and Finance 28, 2191-2212.
Jiménez, G., Salas, V., and Saurina, J, 2004, Determinants of Collateral, mimeo, Bank of Spain.
Leeth, J.D., and Scott, J.A., 1989, The Incidence of Secured Debt: Evidence from the Small
Business Community, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 24, 379-394.
34
Manove, M., Padilla, A.J., and Pagano, M., 2001, Collateral vs. Project Screening: A Model
of Lazy Banks, Rand Journal of Economics 32, 726-744.
Orgler, Y., 1970, A Credit Scoring Model for Commercial Loans, Journal of Money, Credit,
and Banking 2, 435-445.
Petersen, M.A., and Rajan, R.G., 1994, The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from
Small Business Data, Journal of Finance 49, 3-37.
Petersen, M.A., and Rajan, R.G., 1995, The Effects of Credit Market Competition on Lending
Relationships, Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, 407-444.
Petersen, M.A., and Rajan, R.G., 2002, Does Distance Still Matter? The Information Revolu-
tion in Small Business Lending, Journal of Finance 57, 2533-2570.
Rajan, R.G., 1992, Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice Between Informed and Arm’s Length
Debt, Journal of Finance 47, 1367-1399.
Rajan, R.G., and Winton, A., 1995, Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to Monitor, Journal
of Finance 50, 1113-1146.
Reid, G.C., 1991, Staying in Business, International Journal of Industrial Organization 9, 545-
556.
Saunders, A., and Allen, L., 2002, Credit Risk Measurement, Second Edition. New York: John
Wiley & Sons.
Saunders, A., and Thomas, H., 2001, Financial Institutions Management, Second Canadian
Edition. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson.
Sharpe, S., 1990, Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized
Model of Customer Relationships, Journal of Finance 45, 1069-1087.
Stein, J.C., 2002, Information Production and Capital Allocation: Decentralized vs. Hierar-
chical Firms, Journal of Finance 57, 1891-1921.
Strahan, P.E., 1999, Borrower Risk and the Price and Nonprice Terms of Bank Loans, mimeo,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
35
Thakor, A.V., 1996, Capital Requirements, Monetary Policy, and Aggregate Bank Lending:
Theory and Empirical Evidence, Journal of Finance 51, 279-324.
Treacy, W. F., and Carey, M., 2000, Credit Risk Rating Systems at Large US banks, Journal
of Banking and Finance 24, 167-201.
von Thadden, E.-L., 2004, Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending, and Implicit Contracts:
The Winner’s Curse, Finance Research Letters 1, 11-23.
Zarutskie, R., 2004, New Evidence on Bank Competition, Firm Borrowing and Firm Perfor-
mance, mimeo, Duke University.
36
